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Abstract
Recent advances in video manipulation tech-
niques have made the generation of fake videos
more accessible than ever before. Manipulated
videos can fuel disinformation and reduce trust
in media. Therefore detection of fake videos has
garnered immense interest in academia and in-
dustry. Recently developed Deepfake detection
methods rely on deep neural networks (DNNs)
to distinguish AI-generated fake videos from real
videos. In this work, we demonstrate that it is
possible to bypass such detectors by adversarially
modifying fake videos synthesized using existing
Deepfake generation methods. We further demon-
strate that our adversarial perturbations are robust
to image and video compression codecs, making
them a real-world threat. We present pipelines
in both white-box and black-box attack scenarios
that can fool DNN based Deepfake detectors into
classifying fake videos as real.
1. Introduction
With the advent of sophisticated image and video synthesis
techniques, it has become increasingly easier to generate
high-quality convincing fake videos. Deepfakes are a new
genre of synthetic videos, in which a subject’s face is modi-
fied into a target face in order to simulate the target subject
in a certain context and create convincingly realistic footage
of events that never occurred. Video manipulation methods
like Face2Face (Thies et al., 2016), Neural Textures (Thies
et al., 2019) and FaceSwap (Kowalski) operate end-to-end
on a source video and target face and require minimal human
expertise to generate fake videos in real-time.
The intent of generating such videos can be harmless and
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have advanced the research of synthetic video generation
for movies, storytelling and modern-day streaming services.
However, they can also be used maliciously to spread dis-
information, harass individuals or defame famous person-
alities (Suwajanakorn et al., 2017). The extensive spread
of fake videos through social media platforms has raised
significant concerns worldwide, particularly hampering the
credibility of digital media.
Figure 1. Adversarial Deepfakes for XceptionNet (Rossler et al.,
2019) detector. Top: Frames of of a fake video generated by
Face2Face being correctly identified as fake by the detector.
Bottom: Corresponding frames of the adversarially modified fake
video being classified as real by the detector.
To address the threats imposed by Deepfakes, the machine
learning community has proposed several countermeasures
to identify forgeries in digital media. Recent state-of-the-art
methods for detecting manipulated facial content in videos
rely on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) (Dolhansky
et al., 2019; Rossler et al., 2019; Afchar et al., 2018; Amerini
et al., 2019; Li & Lyu, 2019; Rahmouni et al., 2017). A
typical Deepfake detector consists of a face-tracking method,
following which the cropped face is passed on to a CNN-
based classifier for classification as real or fake (Afchar
et al., 2018; Chollet, 2017).
While the above pipeline achieves promising results in ac-
curately detecting manipulated videos, in this paper we
demonstrate that it is susceptible to adversarial examples
which can fool the detector to classify fake videos as real 1.
An adversarial example is an intentionally perturbed input
1Video Examples: https://adversarialdeepfakes.github.io/
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that can fool a victim classification model (Szegedy et al.,
2014). Even though several works have demonstrated that
neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial inputs (Sec-
tion 2.3), we want to explicitly raise this issue that has been
ignored by existing works on Deepfake detection (Section
2.2). Since fake video generation can potentially be used for
malicious purposes, it is critical to address the vulnerability
of Deepfake detectors to adversarial inputs.
To this end, we quantitatively assess the vulnerability of
state-of-the-art Deepfake detectors to adversarial examples.
Our proposed methods can augment existing techniques for
generating fake videos, such that they can bypass a given
fake video detector. We generate adversarial examples for
each frame of a given fake video and combine them to-
gether to synthesize an adversarially modified video that
gets classified as real by the victim Deepfake detector. We
demonstrate that it is possible to construct fake videos that
are robust to image and video compression codecs, making
them a real world threat since videos shared over social
media are usually compressed. More alarmingly, we demon-
strate that it is possible to craft robust adversarial Deepfakes
in black-box settings, where the adversary may not be aware
of the classification model used by the detector. Finally, we
discuss normative points about how the community should
approach the problem of Deepfake detection.
2. Background
2.1. Generating Manipulated Videos
Until recently, the ease of generating manipulated videos
have been limited by manual editing tools. However, since
the advent of deep learning and inexpensive computing
services, there has been significant work in developing new
techniques for automatic digital forgery. In our work, we
generate adversarial examples for fake videos synthesized
using the following methods:
FaceSwap (FS): FaceSwap (Kowalski) is a classical com-
puter graphics-based approach for face replacement in
videos. In this method, sparse facial landmarks are detected
to extract the face region in an image. These landmarks
are then used to fit a 3D template model which is back-
projected onto the target image by minimizing the distance
between the projected shape and localized landmarks. Fi-
nally, the rendered model is blended with the image and
color correction is applied.
Face2Face (F2F): Face2Face (Thies et al., 2016) is a fa-
cial reenactment system that transfers the expressions of a
person in a source video to another person in a target video,
while maintaining the identity of the target person. In this
method, faces are compressed into a low-dimensional ex-
pression space, where expressions can be easily transferred
from the source to the target.
DeepFakes (DF): While the term Deepfakes has commonly
been used in mainstream media as a blanket term for deep-
learning based face replacement, it is also the name of a
specific manipulation (DeepFakes) method that was spread
via online forums. In the learning phase, two auto-encoders
with a shared encoder are trained to reconstruct the images
of source and target face. To create a fake image, the en-
coded source image is passed as input to the target image
decoder.
NeuralTextures (NT): NeuralTextures (Thies et al., 2019)
is a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) based facial
reenactment technique. In this method, a generative model
is trained to learn the neural texture of a target person using
original video data. The GAN objective is a combination of
adversarial and photometric reconstruction loss.
The authors of (Rossler et al., 2019) curated a dataset of
manipulated videos named FaceForesics++ using the above
methods. While our proposed attacks are generally appli-
cable to CNN detectors for any kind of forgery in images
and videos, we perform our experiments on FaceForesics++
dataset containing videos with only facial forgery.
2.2. Detecting Manipulated Videos
Traditionally, multimedia forensics investigated the authen-
ticity of images (Wang & Farid, 2007; Bohme & Kirchner,
2013; Farid, 2016) using hand-engineered features and/or
a-priori knowledge of the statistical and physical properties
of natural photographs. However, video synthesis methods
can be trained to bypass hand-engineered detectors by mod-
ifying their training objective. We direct readers to Barni
et al. (2018); Bo¨hme & Kirchner (2013) for an overview
of counter-forensic attacks to bypass traditional (non-deep
learning based) methods of detecting forgeries in multime-
dia content.
More recent works have employed CNN-based approaches,
that decompose videos into frames to automatically extract
salient and discriminative visual features pertinent to Deep-
fakes. Some efforts have focused on segmenting the en-
tire input image, in order to detect facial tampering result-
ing from face swapping (Zhou et al., 2017), face morph-
ing (Raghavendra et al., 2017) and splicing attacks (Bappy
et al., 2017; 2019). Other works (Li et al., 2018; Afchar
et al., 2018; Gu¨era & Delp, 2018; Rossler et al., 2019; Sabir
et al., 2019) have focused on detecting face manipulation
artifacts resulting from Deepfake generation methods. Li
et al. (2018) reported that eye blinking is not well repro-
duced in fake videos, and therefore proposed a temporal
approach using CNN/RNN based model to detect a lack
of eye blinking when exposing deepfakes. Similarly, Yang
et al. (2019) used the inconsistency in head pose to detect
fake videos. However, this form of detection can be circum-
vented by purposely incorporating images with closed eyes
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and a variety of head poses in training (Vougioukas et al.,
2019; Duarte et al., 2019).
The Deepfake detectors proposed in Rossler et al. (2019);
Afchar et al. (2018); Dolhansky et al. (2019) model Deep-
fake detection as a per-frame binary classification problem.
In our work, we focus on exposing the vulnerability of
such state-of-the-art Deepfake detectors. Since the task
is to specifically detect facial manipulation, these models
incorporate domain knowledge by using a face tracking
method (Thies et al., 2016) to track the face in the video.
The face is then cropped from the original frame and fed
as input to classification model to be labelled as Real or
Fake. Experimentally, the authors of (Rossler et al., 2019)
demonstrate that incorporation of domain knowledge helps
improve classification accuracy as opposed to using the en-
tire image as input to the classifier. The best performing
classifiers amongst others studied by (Rossler et al., 2019)
were both CNN based models: XceptionNet and MesoNet.
XceptionNet has also been reported as the best performing
classifier for Deepfake detection in the Deepfake Detection
Challenge (Dolhansky et al., 2019) paper.
XceptionNet (Chollet, 2017), first proposed in 2017, is a
modification to the Inception architecture to include depth-
wise separable convolutions and residual connections, which
allow for faster convolutional operations and improve com-
putational efficiency. In order to detect deepfakes, (Rossler
et al., 2019) utilized transfer learning on XceptionNet and
retrained it on forged images. The authors demonstrated that
XceptionNet can outperform several alternative classifiers
in detecting forgeries in both uncompressed and compressed
videos, and identifying forged regions in them. The accu-
racy of this model on the FaceForensics++ Dataset (Rossler
et al., 2019) is reported in Table 1.
MesoNet consists of two fast neural network architec-
tures, Meso-4 and MesoInception-4, and was first proposed
in Afchar et al. (2018) to capture mesoscopic properties of
images. Meso-4 consists of 4 convolutional layers followed
by Dropout and a binary sigmoid classification and con-
sists of 27,977 trainable parameters, while MesoInception-4
replaces the first 2 convolutional layers of the Meso-4 archi-
tecture with a variant of the Inception module inspired by
the Inception (Szegedy et al., 2015) architecture. The accu-
racy of this model on the FaceForensics++ Dataset (Rossler
et al., 2019) is reported in Table 1.
2.3. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are intentionally designed inputs to
a machine learning (ML) model that cause the model to
make a mistake (Szegedy et al., 2014). Prior work has
shown a series of first-order gradient-based attacks to be
fairly effective in fooling DNN based models in both im-
age (Papernot et al., 2016a; 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Shi et al., 2019) and audio (Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Qin
et al., 2019; Neekhara et al., 2019) domains. The objective
of such adversarial attacks is to find a good trajectory that
(i) maximally changes the value of the model’s output and
(ii) pushes the sample towards a low-density region. This
is equivalent to the ML model’s gradient with respect to
input features. Prior work on defenses (Xie et al., 2018)
against adversarial attacks, propose to perform random op-
erations over the input images, e.g., random cropping and
JPEG compression. However, such defenses are shown to
be vulnerable to attack algorithms that are aware of the ran-
domization approach. Particularly, one line of adversarial
attack (Athalye et al., 2018a;b) computes the expected value
of gradients for each of the sub-sampled networks/inputs
and performs attacks that are robust against compression.
3. Methodology
3.1. Victim Models: Deepfake Detectors
In this work, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack
on Deepfake detectors which rely on CNN based classifi-
cation models. These victim detectors work on the frame
level and classify each frame independently as either Real
or Fake using the following two-step pipeline:
1. A face tracking model (Thies et al., 2016) extracts the
bounding box of the face in a given frame.
2. The cropped face is then resized appropriately and passed
as input to a CNN based classifier to be labelled as either
real or fake. In our work, we consider two victim CNN clas-
sifiers: XceptionNet (Chollet, 2017) and MesoNet (Afchar
et al., 2018).
3.2. Threat Model
Given a facially manipulated (fake) video input and a victim
Deepfake detector, our task is to adversarially modify the
fake video such that most of the frames get classified as Real
by the Deepfake detector, while ensuring that the adversarial
modification is quasi-imperceptible.
Distortion Metric: To ensure imperceptibility of the adver-
sarial modification, the Lp norm is a widely used distance
metric for measuring the distortion between the adversar-
ial and original inputs. The authors of (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) recommend constraining the maximum distortion of
any individual pixel by a given threshold , i.e., constraining
the perturbation using an L∞ metric. Additionally, Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015)
based attacks, which are optimized for the L∞ metric, are
more time-efficient than attacks which optimize for L2 or
L0 metrics. Since each video can be composed of thousands
of individual frames, time-efficiency becomes an important
consideration to ensure the proposed attack can be reliably
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Figure 2. An overview of our attack pipeline to generate Adversar-
ial Deepfakes. We generate an adversarial example for each frame
in the given fake video and combine them together to create an
adversarially modified fake video.
used in practice. Therefore, in this work, we use the L∞ dis-
tortion metric for constraining our adversarial perturbation
and optimize for it using gradient sign based methods.
Notation: We follow the notation previously used in Carlini
& Wagner (2017); Papernot et al. (2016b): Define F to be
the full neural network (classifier) including the softmax
function, Z(x) = z to be the output of all layers except the
softmax (so z are the logits), and
F (x) = softmax(Z(x)) = y
The classifier assigns the label C(x) = arg maxi(F (x)i)
to input x.
Problem Formulation: Mathematically, for any given
frame x0 of a fake video, and a victim frame-forgery detec-
tor model C, we aim to find an adversarial frame xadv such
that,
C(xadv ) = Real and ||xadv − x0||∞ < 
Attack Pipeline: An overview of the process of generating
adversarial fake videos is depicted in Figure 2. For any given
frame, we craft an adversarial example for the cropped face,
such that after going through some image transformations
(normalization and resizing), it gets classified as Real by
the classifier. The adversarial face is then placed in the
bounding box of face-crop in the original frame, and the
process is repeated for all frames of the video to create an
adversarially modified fake video. In the following sections,
we consider our attack pipeline under various settings and
goals.
Note that, the proposed attacks can also be applied on detec-
tors that operate on entire frames as opposed to face-crops.
We choose face-crop based victim models because they have
been shown to outperform detectors that operate on entire
frames for detecting facial-forgeries.
3.3. White-box Attack
In this setting, we assume that the attacker has complete
access to the detector model, including the face extraction
pipeline and the architecture and parameters of the classifi-
cation model. To construct adversarial examples using the
attack pipeline described above, we use the iterative gradient
sign method (Kurakin et al., 2016) to optimize the following
loss function:
Minimize loss(x′) where
loss(x′) = max (Z(x′)Fake − Z(x′)Real , 0)
(1)
Here, Z(x)y is the final score for label y before the softmax
operation in the classifier C. Minimizing the above loss
function maximizes the score for our target label Real . The
loss function we use is recommended by Carlini & Wagner
(2017) because it is empirically found to generate less dis-
torted adversarial samples and is robust against defensive
distillation. We use the iterative gradient sign method to op-
timize the above objective while constraining the magnitude
of the perturbation as follows:
xi = xi−1 − clip(α · sign(∇loss(xi−1))) (2)
We continue gradient descent iterations until success or until
a given number number of maximum iterations, whichever
occurs earlier. In our experiments, we demonstrate that
while we are able to achieve an average attack success rate
of 99.05% when we save videos with uncompressed frames,
the perturbation is not robust against video compression
codecs like MJPEG. In the following section, we discuss
our approach to overcome this limitation of our attack.
3.4. Robust White-box Attack
Generally, videos uploaded to social networks and other
media sharing websites are compressed. Standard opera-
tions like compression and resizing are known for removing
adversarial perturbations from an image (Dziugaite et al.,
2016; Das et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017). In order to ensure
that the adversarial videos remain effective even after com-
pression, we craft adversarial examples that are robust over
a given distribution of input transformations (Athalye et al.,
2018b). Given a distribution of input transformations T ,
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input image x, and target class y, our objective is as follows:
xadv = argmaxxEt∼T [F (t(x))y] s.t. ||x− x0||∞ < 
That is, we want to maximize the expected probability of
target class y over the distribution of input transforms T . To
solve the above problem, we update the loss function given
in Equation 1 to be an expectation over input transforms T
as follows:
loss(x) = Et∼T [max (Z(t(x))Fake − Z(t(x))Real , 0)]
Following the law of large numbers, we estimate the above
loss functions for n samples as:
loss(x) =
1
n
∑
ti∼T
[max (Z(ti(x))Fake − Z(ti(x))Real , 0)]
Since the above loss function is a sum of differentiable
functions, it is tractable to compute the gradient of the loss
w.r.t. to the input x. We minimize this loss using the iterative
gradient sign method given by Equation 2. We iterate until a
given a number number of maximum iterations or until the
attack is successful under the sampled set of transformation
functions, whichever happens first.
Next we describe the class of input transformation functions
we consider for the distribution T :
Gaussian Blur: Convolution of the original image with a
Gaussian kernel k . This transform is given by t(x) = k ∗ x
where ∗ is the convolution operator.
Gaussian Noise Addition: Addition of Gaussian noise
sampled from Θ ∼ N (0, σ) to the input image. This trans-
form is given by t(x) = x+ Θ
Translation: We pad the image on all four sides by ze-
ros and shift the pixels horizontally and vertically by a
given amount. Let tx be the transform in the x axis and
ty be the transform in the y axis, then t(x) = x′H,W,C s.t
x′[i, j, c] = x[i+ tx, j + ty, c]
Downsizing and Upsizing: The image is first downsized
by a factor r and then up-sampled by the same factor using
bilinear re-sampling.
The details of the hyper-parameter search distribution used
for these transforms can be found in the Section 4.1. Em-
pirically, we find that ensuring robustness of adversarial
examples to these transforms ensures robustness to JPEG
compression. Intuitively, image translation transform en-
sures robustness to different crops of the face, while gaus-
sian blur, gaussian noise and resizing ensure robustness to
JPEG artifacts.
3.5. Black-box Attack
In the black-box setting, we consider the more challenging
threat model in which the adversary does not have access
to the classification network architecture and parameters.
We assume that the attacker has knowledge of the detection
pipeline structure and the face tracking model. However,
the attacker can solely query the classification model as a
black-box function to obtain the probabilities of the frame
being Real or Fake. Hence there is a need to estimate the
gradient of the loss function by querying the model and
observing the change in output for different inputs, since we
cannot backpropagate through the network.
We base our algorithm for efficiently estimating the gradient
from queries on the Natural Evolutionary Strategies (NES)
approach of (Wierstra et al., 2014; Ilyas et al., 2018). Since
we do not have access to the pre-softmax outputs Z, we aim
to maximize the class probability F (x)y of the target class
y. Rather than maximizing the objective function directly,
NES maximizes the expected value of the function under a
search distribution pi(θ|x). That is, our objective is:
Maximize: Epi(θ|x)[F (θ)y]
This allows efficient gradient estimation in fewer queries
as compared to finite-difference methods. From (Wierstra
et al., 2014), we know the gradient of expectation can be
derived as follows:
∇xEpi(θ|x) [F (θ)y] = Epi(θ|x) [F (θ)y∇x log (pi(θ|x))]
Similar to (Ilyas et al., 2018; Wierstra et al., 2014), we
choose a search distribution pi(θ|x) of random Gaussian
noise around the current image x. That is, θ = x+σδ where
δ ∼ N (0, I). Estimating the gradient with a population of
n samples yields the following variance reduced gradient
estimate:
∇E[F (θ)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1
δiF (θ + σδi)y
We use antithetic sampling to generate δi similar to (Sal-
imans et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018). That is, instead
of generating n values δ ∼ N (0, I), we sample Gaus-
sian noise for i ∈ {1, . . . , n2 } and set δj = −δn−j+1 for
j ∈ {(n2 + 1), . . . , n}. This optimization has been empiri-
cally shown to improve performance of NES. Algorthim 1
details our implementation of estimating gradients using
NES. The transformation distribution T in the algorithm
just contains an identity function i.e., T = {I(x)} for the
black-box attack described in this section.
After estimating the gradient, we move the input in the di-
rection of this gradient using iterative gradient sign updates
to increase the probability of target class:
xi = xi−1 + clip(α · sign(∇F (xi−1)y)) (3)
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3.6. Robust Black-box Attack
In order to ensure robustness of adversarial videos to com-
pression, we incorporate Expectation over Transforms (Sec-
tion 3.4) method in the black-box setting for constructing
adversarial videos.
To craft adversarial examples that are robust under a given
set of input transformations T , we maximize the expected
value of the function under a search distribution pi(θ|x) and
our distribution of input transforms T . That is, our objective
is to maximize:
Et∼T [Epi(θ|x) [F (t(θ))y]]
Following the derivation in the previous section, the gradient
of the above expectation can be estimated using a population
of size n by iterative sampling of ti and δi:
∇E[F (θ)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1,ti∼T
δiF (ti(θ + σδi))y
Algorithm 1 NES Gradient Estimate
Input: Classifier F (x),target class y, image x
Output: Estimate of∇xF (x)y
Parameters: Search variance σ, number of samples n,
image dimensionality N
g ← 0n
for i = 1 to n do
ti ∼ T
ui ← N (0N , IN ·N )
g ← g + F (ti(x+ σ · ui))y · ui
g ← g − F (ti(x− σ · ui))y · ui
end for
return 12nσ g
We use the same class of transformation functions listed in
Section 3.4 for the distribution T . Algorithm 1 details our
implementation for estimating gradients for crafting robust
adversarial examples. We follow the same update rule given
by Equation 3 to generate adversarial frames. We iterate
until a given a number of maximum iterations or until the
attack is successful under the sampled set of transformation
functions.
4. Experiments
Dataset andModels: We evaluate our proposed attack algo-
rithm on two pre-trained victim models: XceptionNet (Chol-
let, 2017) and MesoNet (Afchar et al., 2018). In our exper-
iments, we perform our attack on the test set of the Face-
Forensics++ Dataset (Rossler et al., 2019), consisting of
manipulated videos from the four methods described in Sec-
tion 2.1. We construct adversarially modified fake videos
on the FaceForensics++ test set, which contains 70 videos
(total 29,764 frames) from each of the four manipulation
techniques. For simplicity, our experiments are performed
on high quality (HQ) videos, which apply a light compres-
sion on raw videos. The accuracy of the detector models
for detecting facially manipulated videos on this test set is
reported in Table 1. We will be releasing code for all our
attack algorithms in PyTorch2.
DF F2F FS NT
XceptionNet 97.49 97.69 96.79 92.19
MesoNet 89.55 88.6 81.24 76.62
Table 1. Accuracy of Deepfake detectors on the FaceForensics++
HQ Dataset as reported in Rossler et al. (2019). The results are for
the entire high-quality compressed test set generated using four
manipulation techniques (DF: DeepFakes, F2F: Face2Face, FS:
FaceSwap and NT: NeuralTextures).
Evaluation Metrics: Once the adversarial frames are gen-
erated, we combine them and save the adversarial videos in
the following formats:
1) Uncompressed (Raw): Video is stored as a sequence of
uncompressed images.
2) Compressed (MJPEG): Video is saved as a sequence of
JPEG compressed frames.
3) Compressed (H.264): Video is saved in the commonly
used mp4 format that applies temporal compression across
frames.
We conduct our primary evaluation on the Raw and MJPEG
video formats across all attacks. We also study the effec-
tiveness of our white box robust attack using different com-
pression levels in the H264 codec. We report the following
metrics for evaluating our attacks:
Success Rate (SR): The percentage of frames in the ad-
versarial videos that get classified to our target label Real.
We report: SR-U- Attack success rate on uncompressed
adversarial videos saved in Raw format; and SR-C- At-
tack success rate on compressed adversarial videos saved in
MJPEG format.
Mean distortion (L∞): The average L∞ distortion be-
tween the adversarial and original frames. The pixel val-
ues are scaled in the range [0,1], so changing a pixel from
full-on to full-off in a grayscale image would result in L∞
distortion of 1 (not 255).
4.1. White-box Setting
To craft adversarial examples in the white-box setting, in
our attack pipeline, we implement differentiable image pre-
processing (resizing and normalization) layers for the CNN.
This allows us to backpropagate gradients all the way to
the cropped face in-order to generate the adversarial image
2Code released upon publication
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that can be placed back in the frame. We set the maximum
number of iterations to 100, learning rate α to 1/255 and
max L∞ constraint  to 16/255 for both our attack methods
described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
XceptionNet MesoNet
Dataset L∞ SR - U SR - C L∞ SR - U SR - C
DF 0.004 99.67 43.11 0.006 97.30 92.27
F2F 0.004 99.85 52.50 0.007 98.94 96.30
FS 0.004 100.00 43.13 0.009 97.12 86.10
NT 0.004 99.89 95.10 0.007 99.22 96.20
All 0.004 99.85 58.46 0.007 98.15 92.72
Table 2. Success Rate of White-box attack on XceptionNet and
MesoNet. We report the average L∞ distortion between the adver-
sarial and original frames and the attack success rate on uncom-
pressed (SR-U) and compressed (SR-C) videos.
Table 2 shows the results of the white-box attack (Sec-
tion 3.3). We are able to generate adversarial videos with
an average success rate of 99.85% for fooling XceptionNet
and 98.15% for MesoNet when adversarial videos are saved
in the Raw format. However, the attack average success rate
drops to 58.46% for XceptionNet and 92.72% for MesoNet
when MJPEG compression is used. This result is coherent
with past works (Dziugaite et al., 2016; Das et al., 2017;
Guo et al., 2017) that employ JPEG compression and image
transformations to defend against adversarial examples.
Fake (from Dataset) White-Box Robust White-Box Black-Box Robust Black-Box
DF
F2F
FS
NT
Figure 3. Randomly selected frames of Adversarial Deepfakes
from successful attacks. The frame from the dataset in the first
column is correctly identified as Fake by the detectors, while the
corresponding frames generated by each of our attacks are labelled
as Real with a probability of 1. Video examples are linked in the
footnote on the first page.
Robust White-Box: For our robust white box attack, we
sample 12 transformation functions from the distribution T
for estimating the gradient in each iteration. This includes
three functions from each of the four transformations listed
in Section 3.4. Table 3 shows the search distribution for
different hyper-parameters of the transformation functions.
Transform Hyper-parameter search distribution
Gaussian Blur Kernel k(d, d, σ), d ∼ U [3, 7], σ ∼ U [5, 10]
Gaussian Noise σ ∼ U [0.01, 0.02]
Translation dx ∼ U [−20, 20], dy ∼ U [−20, 20]
Down-sizing & Up-sizing Scaling factor r ∼ U [2, 5]
Table 3. Search distribution of hyper-parameters of different trans-
formations used for our Robust White box attack. During training,
we sample three functions from each of the transforms to estimate
the gradient of our expectation over transforms.
Table 4 shows the results of our robust white-box attack.
It can be seen that robust white-box is effective in both
Raw and MJPEG formats. The average distortion between
original and adversarial frames in the robust attack is higher
as compared to the non-robust white-box attack. We achieve
an average success rate (SR-C) of 98.07% and 99.83% for
XceptionNet and MesoNet respectively in the compressed
video format.
We also study the effectiveness of our robust white box
attack under different levels of compression in the H.264
format which is widely used for sharing videos over the
internet. Figure 4 shows the average success rate of our
attack across all datasets for different quantization parameter
c used for saving the video in H.264 format. The higher
the quantization factor, the higher is the compression level.
In Rossler et al. (2019), fake videos are saved in HQ and LQ
formats which use c = 23 and c = 40 respectively. It can be
seen that even at very high compression levels (c = 40), our
attack is able to achieve 80.39% and 90.50% attack success
rate for XceptionNet and MesoNet respectively, without any
additional hyper-parameter tuning for this experiment.
XceptionNet MesoNet
Dataset L∞ SR - U SR - C L∞ SR - U SR - C
DF 0.016 99.56 98.71 0.030 99.94 99.85
F2F 0.013 100.00 99.00 0.020 99.71 99.67
FS 0.013 100.00 95.33 0.026 99.02 98.50
NT 0.011 100.00 99.89 0.025 99.99 99.98
All 0.013 99.89 98.23 0.025 99.67 99.50
Table 4. Success Rate of Robust White-box attack on XceptionNet
and MesoNet.
4.2. Black-box Setting
We construct adversarial examples in the black-box setting
using the methods described in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. The
number of samples n in the search distribution for estimating
gradients using NES is set to 20 for black-box attacks and
80 for robust black-box to account for sampling different
transformation functions ti. We set the maximum number
of iterations to 100, learning rate α to 1/255 and max L∞
constraint  to 16/255.
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Figure 4. Attack success rate vs Quantization factor used for com-
pression in H264 codec for robust white box attack.
Table 5 shows the results of our Black-box attack (Sec-
tion 3.5) without robust transforms. Note that the average
L∞ norm of the perturbation across all datasets and mod-
els is higher than our white-box attacks. We are able to
generate adversarial videos with an average success rate of
97.04% for XceptionNet and 86.70% for MesoNet when
adversarial videos are saved in the Raw format. Similar to
our observation in the white-box setting, the success rate
drops significantly in the compressed format for this attack.
The average number of queries to the victim model for each
frame is 985 for this attack.
Robust Black-box: We perform robust black-box attack
using the algorithm described in (Section 3.6). For sim-
plicity, during the robust black-box attack we use the same
hyper-parameters for creating a distribution of transforma-
tion functions T (Table 3) as those in our robust white-box
attack. The average number of network queries for fooling
each frame is 2153 for our robust black-box attack. Table
6 shows the results for our robust black-box attack. We ob-
serve a significant improvement in the attack success rate for
XceptionNet when we save adversarial videos in the com-
pressed format as compared to that in the naive black-box
attack setting. When attacking MesoNet in robust black-
box setting, we do not observe a significant improvement
even though overall success rate is higher when using robust
transforms.
XceptionNet MesoNet
Dataset L∞ SR - U SR - C L∞ SR - U SR - C
DF 0.055 89.72 55.64 0.062 96.05 93.33
F2F 0.055 92.56 81.40 0.0627 84.08 77.68
FS 0.045 96.77 23.50 0.0627 77.55 62.44
NT 0.024 99.86 94.23 0.0627 85.98 79.25
All 0.045 94.73 63.69 0.0626 85.92 78.18
Table 5. Success Rate of Black-box attack on XceptionNet and
MesoNet.
XceptionNet MesoNet
Dataset L∞ SR - U SR - C L∞ SR - U SR - C
DF 0.060 88.47 79.18 0.047 96.19 93.80
F2F 0.058 97.68 94.42 0.054 84.14 77.50
FS 0.052 98.97 63.26 0.061 77.34 61.77
NT 0.018 99.65 98.91 0.053 88.05 80.27
All 0.047 96.19 83.94 0.053 86.43 78.33
Table 6. Success Rate of Robust Black-box attack on XceptionNet
and MesoNet.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The intent of Deepfake generation can be malicious and
their detection is a security concern. Current works on
CNN-based Deepfake detection assume a non-adaptive ad-
versary whose aim is to fool the human-eye by generating a
realistic fake video. In order to use these detectors in prac-
tice, we argue that it is essential to evaluate them against
an adaptive adversary who is aware of the defense being
present and is intentionally trying to fool the defense. In
this paper, we show that the current state-of-the-art methods
for Deepfake detection can be easily bypassed if the adver-
sary has complete or even partial knowledge of the detector.
Therefore, there is a need for developing provably robust
detectors that are evaluated under different attack scenarios
and attacker capabilities.
In order to use DNN based classifiers as detectors, ensuring
robustness to adversarial examples is necessary but not suffi-
cient. A well-equipped attacker may devise other methods to
by-pass the detector: For example, Attacker can modify the
training objective of the Deepfake generator to include a loss
term corresponding to the detector score. Classifiers trained
in a supervised manner on existing Deepfake generation
methods, cannot be reliably secure against novel Deepfake
generation methods not seen during training. We recom-
mend approaches similar to Adversarial Training (Goodfel-
low et al., 2015) to train robust Deepfake detectors. That is,
during training, an adaptive adversary continues to generate
novel Deepfakes that can bypass the current state of the
detector and the detector continues improving in order to
detect the new Deepfakes.
In conclusion, we highlight that adversarial examples are a
practical concern for current CNN based Deepfake detectors
and therefore recommend future work on provably robust
Deepfake detectors.
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